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Abstract 
 
Northern Ireland has traditionally housed a discordant mix of those that identify as Irish Catholic 
and those that consider themselves British Protestant. After a thirty-year period of political and 
ethnic violence known as the Troubles, these two groups came to peace terms in 1998. Yet, a 
sense of distinction between Irish Catholics and British Protestants remains in this society today. 
Research indicates that identity is changing in Northern Ireland in both kind and numbers, and 
individuals now form identity in a climate vastly different than that of their parents. While there 
is a wealth of research on the general population and youth in Northern Ireland, little qualitative 
focus has been given to young adults in the region, particularly in religion. My primary research 
questions are, 1) How do young adults in Northern Ireland identify religiously and nationally? 
and 2) How do they form this identity?. Using a social identity perspective, sixteen qualitative, 
in-depth interviews were conducted in Belfast, Northern Ireland with those ages 18-35. 
Structured questions were asked to all participants, designed to elicit narratives about the nature 
and formation of national and religious identities. Results indicate that while these two identities 
were previously nearly synonymous, young adults in Northern Ireland today disassociate with a 
religious identity yet retain a national identity. Furthermore, young adults categorize society by 
level of tolerance, and form national and religious identity from parental influence and 
geographic upbringing. Through this research, I hope to present a more accurate portrayal of the 
current religious and national climate in Northern Ireland and the evolution of identity for young 
adults in this area. 
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Geographically on the island of Ireland and territorially a part of the United Kingdom, 
Northern Ireland has a longstanding history of clashing national and religious identities. Conflict 
in the country has primarily hinged on these socially determined boundaries, creating a society of 
those that consider themselves to be Irish Catholics versus those that are British Protestants. 
While the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain are now on peaceful political and social terms, 
citizens in Northern Ireland struggle to find unity. Inhabitants of this space face a challenge of 
self-categorization: how to form national and religious identities in a post-conflict but socially 
divided area. 
In the twelfth century, Catholic Ireland was brought under English rule, instigating 
sectarian animosity between the two cultures. Ireland did not regain its independence from 
Britain until 1921, when the island was split into the free state of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom-ruled Northern Ireland, dictated by the Protestant majority in the north (Bull 2006). By 
the 1960s, years of ethnic tension and unequal status between Irish Catholics and British 
Protestants resulted in riots and the formation of paramilitary groups. The next thirty years, 
named ‘the Troubles,’ marked a time of great sectarian violence in Northern Ireland; the two 
communities routinely attacked, bombed, and killed both military members and civilians on the 
basis of social group membership (Quinn 2007). Although the Troubles officially ended with the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement, society is still somewhat split along these cultural lines. 
Today, Northern Ireland primarily houses a mix of those that are Irish, British, Northern 
Irish, or Ulster, with the majority still identifying as Irish or British (Sedghi 2012). Those that 
consider themselves Irish have historically simultaneously desired reunification with Ireland and 
identified as Catholic, creating an overlapping, synonymous ‘Irish, Catholic, nationalist’ identity. 
Likewise, those that consider themselves primarily British have typically identified as Protestant 
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and unionist, desiring a continued union with the United Kingdom. These comprehensive, 
analogous identities segregate the country culturally, politically, socially, and otherwise, with 
schools, churches, leisure centers, neighborhoods, and sports teams often attaching to an Irish 
Catholic or British Protestant affiliation. 
 However, in the aftermath of the Troubles, this identification has become less predictable 
(Lamont and Bail 2005). Shifting patterns of identity indicate that residents of Northern Ireland 
increasingly form self-identity based on membership in other groups, both within the realm of 
nationality and religion and outside of it (Cassidy and Trew 2005). 
 While much quantitative data exists on youth1 and adults in this post-conflict area, little 
qualitative focus has been given to young adults, especially on religion. To address this gap, 
sixteen qualitative, in-depth interviews were conducted in Belfast, Northern Ireland in July and 
August 2014. My primary research questions were: 1) How do young adults in Northern Ireland 
identify nationally and religiously? and 2) How do they form these identities?. 
 Nine participants primarily identify nationally as Irish, three as British, and four as 
Northern Irish. Only one participant identifies as Catholic, seven are solely atheist/agnostic, three 
are atheist/agnostic but also Catholic, and five are atheist/agnostic but also Protestant. Overall, 
participants rated religion as a very unimportant part of their sense of self, and nationality of 
moderate importance. 
 For the purpose of this paper, “Irish” and “British” will refer to those that self-identify as 
such while still living in Northern Ireland. Likewise, “Northern Irish” will refer to those 
identifying as such, and will not refer to all residents that live in Northern Ireland as much of the 
literature does. Furthermore, the “island of Ireland” will refer to the island as a whole, and 
“southern Ireland” or the “Republic of Ireland” will refer to the sovereign nation, including 
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County Donegal. “Northern Ireland” will refer to only the six counties under rule of the United 
Kingdom. 
Review of the Literature 
Social differentiation in Northern Ireland has thrived because of the distinct group 
processes that dictate senses of identity. Tajfel and Turner outline these social patterns in their 
work on social identity theory, emphasizing both interactions between groups and within them 
(Muldoon et al. 2007). These social identities, described as “the individual’s knowledge that he 
belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of 
the group membership,” create cleavages within society and are inseparably connected to self-
conception (Tajfel 1972:31; Hogg and Abrams 1988). 
As social beings, we naturally form groups based on commonalities. Categorization helps 
simplify our social environment and make it more manageable, promoting mental and social 
well-being (Tajfel 1978). These groups give us a sense of belonging, provide us with a support 
network, help us achieve and set goals, and accomplish change that would often be 
insurmountable at an idiosyncratic level (Baumeister and Leary 1995; Haslam et al. 2009; 
Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). A strong social identity is thus associated with overall 
psychological health, and a person’s self-esteem may be further promoted through membership 
in high-status, supportive groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). 
While Turner argues that we act in ways characteristic of the group due to our cognitive 
identification with said group, Abrams theorizes that this is because we desire a low level of 
uncertainty in a group; we are motivated to reduce any disagreements of action between 
members, creating a system of conformity (Thoits and Virshup 1997; Hogg and Abrams 1993). 
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Our actions, therefore, become guided by our set of group memberships, and the identity of the 
group is shaped by the collective social scripts of its members.  
We derive much of our self-concept from these memberships, and as Anderson notes, 
“The self is possible only in the web of connected lives” (Hargie et al. 2008:793). Thus, our 
sense of self is formed and perpetuated by social categories such as gender, class, race, 
nationality, and occupation, among others (Terry, Hogg, and White 1999). Born into a set of 
previously structured social categories, over the course of our lifetime we develop a distinctive 
set of identities which comprise our unique self-concept (Stets and Burke 2000). 
To simplify our environment, we accentuate similarities within a group as well as 
differences between groups (Hargie et al. 2008). Social life is built upon a system of inclusion 
and exclusion, where “persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and 
labeled as the in-group, and people who differ from the self are categorized as the out-group” 
(Stets and Burke 2000:225). These in-groups and out-groups exist only in relation to each other, 
highlighting which has more or less stature or prominence (Stets and Burke 2000). Members of 
the in-group thus view it as more favorable than the out-group, motivated for a need for positive 
identity and increased self-esteem (Harwood, Giles, and Palomares 2005).  
Self-categorization and social comparison are not without consequences, however. As 
opinion of the in-group increases, opinions of other groups often conversely decrease (Stets and 
Burke 2000). This social identity perspective is thus useful for understanding group bias and 
collective discrimination. 
To create these social categories, individuals must separate into groups based on a 
distinguishable feature. Religion is often this method of stratification in a society, as 
demonstrated by several studies noting in-group favoritism based on religious denomination or 
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identification (Brewer and Higgins 1999; Kremer, Barry, and McNally 1986; Stringer and Cairns 
1983). National identity, informed by birthplace, residence, accent, ethnicity, or ancestry, may 
likewise become a mode of distinction when conflicting nationalities exist in a single location 
(McCrone and Bechhofer 2008). 
When an association between religion and nationhood forms, religious symbols become 
iconic representations of nationality as well (Brubaker 2012). These identities comprise and 
become facets of ethnicity, and ethnic identity becomes the product of “actions undertaken by 
ethnic groups as they shape and reshape their self-definition and culture” (Nagel 1994:152). This 
communal identity encompasses nationality, religion, language, geography, and several other 
components of society which create a shared ethnic outlook (Gurr 1993). 
Tajfel notes that social categorization becomes of particular importance if two conditions 
are applicable: “If the division of the social world is such as to produce two clearly distinct and 
non-overlapping categories” and “if there exists a serious difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
passing from one group to another” (Bull 2006:41). The cultural, political, and ethnic climate of 
Northern Ireland led to the embodiment of these conditions in dichotomous Irish Catholic and 
British Protestant identities, rooted in continual historical struggle. 
Ireland’s history marks over 700 years of English, then British, involvement and control 
in its affairs and government. The English in Ireland date back to the 12th century, although at the 
time the English monarchy over Ireland was essentially only nominal. In the 16th century, Queen 
Elizabeth I brought Ireland under full control of England, and her successor, James I, extended 
the English government’s power even further. By initiating the ‘Plantation of Ulster,’ he 
instigated Protestant English colonization in Catholic Ireland, leading to a series of unsuccessful 
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rebellions by the Irish (Bull 2006). Sectarian animosity between the groups consequently 
escalated as Catholic land was taken over by these Protestant colonies. 
Catholics and Protestants then began competing for this universal rule of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland. When Catholic King James II took control in 1685, he was quickly 
overthrown by Protestant William of Orange. An attempt to recapture the throne at the Battle of 
the Boyne was fruitless, marking James II England’s last Roman Catholic monarch. Many 
British Protestants in Northern Ireland celebrate William’s victory every year on the 12th of July, 
christened “Orangeman’s Day” (BBC History, Battle).  
Ireland did not gain its independence back from Britain until 1921, when the Irish War 
for Independence, prompted by the newly formed Irish Republican Army (IRA), ended with the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The new free state of Ireland encompassed twenty-six of the 
thirty-two counties on the island of Ireland, and the remaining six counties became Northern 
Ireland (Bull 2006). This partition did not solve conflict between the two communities, however; 
instead, it concentrated it into the north, where those that wished to rejoin the Republic of Ireland 
and those that wished to remain in union with Britain now coexisted in a defined geographic 
area. These identities became difficult to reconcile, as both groups experienced minority status: 
Irish Catholics within the United Kingdom and British Protestants on the island of Ireland 
(Jackson 1971). Both groups felt threatened by the other, creating a society in which each side 
considered themselves the in-group and the other the out-group.  
These conflicting identities and ideologies served as the catalyst for a period of violent 
conflict from 1968-1990 called ‘the Troubles.’ Belonging to one identity became as much about 
holding that membership as it was about not holding the other one. While this placed Catholics 
and Protestants on opposite sides, this conflict was not theological, but ethnic and political, in 
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nature (Brewer and Higgins 1999). Extreme in-group and out-group tendencies, unequal status 
for Irish Catholics, and a sharp divide in society erupted into violent ethnic conflict. Paramilitary 
groups such as the IRA and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) staged riots, murdered civilians, and 
planted bombs, causing routine public searches and political imprisonment (British Broadcasting 
Corporation 2013).  
The Troubles resulted in over 3,600 deaths and more than 50,000 injured, many severely 
(BBC History, Troubles; British Broadcasting Corporation 2013). Considering Northern 
Ireland’s comparatively small geographic region and population, when scaled to the size of the 
United States, this number of deaths is equivalent to over 600,000 (Hargie et al. 2008). Every 
resident of Northern Ireland has been affected by the Troubles or knows someone who has been 
affected—the wounds of this conflict are sociologically still fresh. 
Identity during this time became more polarized, and religion and nationality became 
more synonymous. In 1968, before the Troubles began, about 39% of Protestants in Northern 
Ireland also saw themselves as British, 32% as Ulster, and 20% as Irish. By 1978, two-thirds felt 
British, 20% felt Ulster, and only 8% felt Irish (Muldoon et al. 2007). Today there is still a 
notable association between religious and national identity, where “when targets are multiply 
categorizable, and perceivers can use more than a single dimension of categorization and recall 
subordinate attributes” (Crisp, Hewstone, and Cairns 2001:509). Furthermore, the higher the 
degree of overlap between these identities, the less positive out-group attitudes and lower 
intergroup tolerance (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).  
The Troubles officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, 
establishing the “birthright of all the people in Northern Ireland to identify themselves as Irish or 
British, or both, as they may so choose” (Hayes and McAllister 2009:386). Northern Ireland was 
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reaffirmed as a territory of the United Kingdom for so long as it is the wish of the majority, and 
commitments to equal representation of Irish Catholics and British Protestants were made (Bull 
2006).  
This history of Irish Catholic and British Protestant conflict has consequently structured 
religious and national identity as opposing in Northern Ireland (Muldoon et al. 2007). Society is 
still somewhat segregated, as over ninety percent of children attend Catholic or Protestant 
schools and thirty-five percent of the population overall lives in segregated neighborhoods 
(Hughes, Campbell, and Jenkins 2011). By age six, 90% of children are aware of the divide in 
Northern Ireland, 15% make sectarian comments, and one-third identify with a particular side 
(Connolly, Smith, and Kells 2002). People from all backgrounds are subject to sectarianism to at 
least some degree, and Catholics are more likely than Protestants to be unemployed (McGrellis 
2005; McCartan 2015). Religious and national labels still mark society despite decreased 
religiosity and territorial vehemence, and it is difficult to create collective citizenship due to the 
lack of consensus on nationality and treatment of religion as a badge of membership (Evans and 
Tonge 2013; Smith 2003; McAllister 2000).  
However, Northern Ireland has shown significant progress since the Good Friday 
Agreement, both in action and mindset. National violence is now replaced with a more peaceful 
and tolerant outlook on nationalism. Moreover, religious, national, and political identities are not 
as synonymous as they once were: Lamont and Bail note that it is currently very possible for a 
person to be Catholic without being republican (2005). People look to other memberships for 
composition of their social identity, citing their friends, significant other, university, and family 
as more important to their sense of identity than nationality and religion (Cassidy and Trew 
1998).  
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Starting in the 1990s, residents of Northern Ireland began identifying as “Northern Irish,” 
a new nationality free of sectarian connotations and built upon an inherent ambiguity (Hayes and 
McAllister 2009; Moxon-Brown 1991). The Northern Irish are more likely to be educated, 
young, and middle class, but often still identify as nationalist or unionist, meaning Catholics and 
Protestants alike can share in a Northern Irish identity without sacrificing a political ideology. 
Although they are proud of their Northern Irish identity, many assert that is not an important part 
of their sense of self (Trew 1998).  
While this Northern Irish identity is often believed to be the result of successful 
intergroup contact, it lacks the same intensity of feeling as other identities, and the majority feel 
that being Northern Irish does not solve the divide (McKeown 2013; Hayes and McAllister 2009; 
Ewart and Schubotz 2004). Yang argues that cultural differences are inherently necessary to 
uphold societal unity: in a Chinese-American Christian church, the ethnic quality of the church 
meets members’ needs for affiliation, intimacy, and security. This allows them to then interact 
positively outside of the religious sector with those of other ethnicities (1998). Positive 
interactions, therefore, come from a place of identification, not disassociation. 
In the short amount of time since the conclusion of the Troubles, Northern Ireland has 
made great strides in the reconciliation between ethnicities. As the country becomes less 
religious and decreasingly focused on sectarianism, these ethnic identities evolve as group 
relations continue to change. Research suggests that patterns of allegiance are now more 
complex than just religion, nationality, and politics, and most children can form identity in 
violence-free world—a vastly different climate than that of their parents (Coakley 2002; Trew 
2004).  
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Young adults in modern Northern Ireland have thus been able to form identity largely 
outside of the Troubles. As the upcoming policy makers, leaders, and future of Northern Ireland, 
it is important to understand what memberships they hold and how they form social identity.  
Methodology 
To examine the current state of religious and national identities of young adults as well as 
how they form these identities, sixteen in-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted in 
Belfast, Northern Ireland in July and August 2014. Interviews were face-to-face, and all were 
conducted after the 12th of July, Orangeman’s Day. They ranged from 18 minutes to 99 minutes 
in length, averaging 42 minutes. 
Recruitment occurred through flyers posted near Queen’s University Belfast and on 
Reddit, a ‘community bulletin board’ website, to the subreddit r/NorthernIreland. Additionally, 
four friends of previous participants indicated interest and participated as well, creating a 
snowball sample. Conditions for participation included having primarily grown up in Northern 
Ireland and age (18-35). Participants were informed that the interviews would involve topics of 
religion and nationality on the recruitment flyer and then again through email. 
Participants were allowed to pick the interview location and given suggestions such as 
Queen’s University, various libraries and coffee shops in downtown Belfast or the University 
Quarter, or any quiet, public location. This was to ensure that participants would be interviewed 
in a neutral2 location or ethnic area that they felt comfortable in.  
Several conditions led to the selection of Belfast: a) the percentage of Irish, British, and 
Northern Irish in Belfast is closer than Londonderry to the percentage overall in Northern 
Ireland3 (NI Census 2014), b) Belfast has distinct Irish, British, as well as non-sectarian areas, 
and c) as the capital city, it houses people from all over Northern Ireland and of various levels of 
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radicalness and education. Furthermore, the neighboring Irish, British, and mixed communities 
create a more heterogeneous area than a homogeneous rural community. Due to travel 
constraints, interview locations were restricted to within the greater Belfast area. However, 
participants represented a mix of those who had grown up in Belfast and elsewhere, as well as 
those coming from larger, more mixed communities and those from smaller, homogeneous, rural 
communities. 
At the start of each interview, participants were informed that their participation was 
completely voluntary, with the ability to not answer any question or stop the interview at any 
time without penalty. Interviews were recorded with participants’ knowledge and consent, and 
each participant signed and was given a copy of an informed-consent form. At the conclusion, 
participants were asked if there was any additional information or comments that they wished to 
contribute and were thanked and given monetary compensation for their time. No group 
interviews were conducted, and all participants received the same amount of compensation 
regardless of length of interview. 
Interviews were somewhat structured with certain questions asked to all participants. 
Questions covered a variety of topics, including nationality, religion, neighborhoods, family, 
education, and politics, designed to elicit narratives about the nature and formation of national 
and religious identities. 
 While some researchers believe non-demographic interview questions should precede 
demographics as to not prime participants, participants in this study were asked their nationality 
and religion at the beginning of the interview due to the level of sensitivity associated with this 
topic and the need to cater certain questions to a participant’s nationality if necessary. 
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When describing groups in the questions, religious, national, or political labels were not 
used in isolation, i.e. saying just “Irish” or “Protestant” instead of “Irish Catholic nationalist,” to 
prevent participants from just mirroring language used in the questions. Whenever possible, 
more ambiguous terms such as “the two communities” or “other groups” were employed, and 
when a specific label was required, “Irish Catholic nationalist” or “British Protestant unionist” 
was used. 
Of the sixteen participants interviewed, twelve are male and four are female. Fourteen are 
university-educated. Age ranged from 19-31, with 23 as the mean age. Nine live in mixed or 
non-sectarian areas, seven live in Irish Catholic areas, and one lives in a distinctively British 
Protestant area. 
Participants were asked if they identify as Irish, British, Northern Irish, Ulster, or 
otherwise. Nine first-identify4 as Irish, three as British, and four as Northern Irish. Eleven 
identify as only one nationality, four identify as two nationalities, and one identifies as three 
nationalities5. In total, ten participants identify as Irish, six as British, five as Northern Irish, and 
one as Ulster. No participants identify as another nationality.  
Participants were then asked if they identify as Catholic, Protestant, neither, or another 
religion. Seven solely identify as atheist, agnostic, or irreligious. Five identify as 
atheist/agnostic/irreligious but also Protestant, and three identify as atheist/agnostic/irreligious 
but also Catholic. One participant solely identifies as Catholic; this participant is religious and 
attends mass regularly. In total, a vast majority therefore identify as atheist, agnostic, or not 
religious (n = 15). No participants identify as other religions or belief systems. 
Participants were asked to rate both their national identity and religious identity from one 
to ten, with one indicating that being that identity is not important to them at all, and ten 
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indicating that it is extremely important. Those that answered between two numbers, e.g. 
“between a 6 and a 7,” were scored in .5 increments. For religion, participants average a 1.16 
with a mode of zero. For nationality, participants average a 3.88 with a mode of 4. This indicates 
that nationality is more important for participants, and religion is of very low importance to 
them. 
Interviews were transcribed in full and a content-based analysis was performed. 
Particular attention was given to how participants described sectarian groups or those they 
viewed as radical, and the language they used to differentiate between people/groups. Questions 
with a targeted religious, national, or political label that would elicit a response with that same 
label, such as “What is your mother’s nationality?” were not included in this analysis. Likewise, 
because schools often have an assigned Catholic or Protestant affiliation, descriptions of schools 
in religious terms were also excluded.  
Results 
My primary research questions are: 1) How do young adults in Northern Ireland identify 
nationally and religious? and 2) How do they form these senses of identity?. Using a social 
identity perspective, I examine the social categories that exist in Northern Ireland today, as well 
as the memberships young adults hold and how they determine these memberships. 
 Sixteen in-depth, qualitative, face-to-face interviews were conducted in Belfast, Northern 
Ireland with those native to Northern Ireland ages 18-35. Interviews were somewhat structured 
and designed to elicit narratives about the nature and formation of national and religious 
identities. All interviews were transcribed in full and a content-based analysis was performed. 
 Results from this study fall into three distinct categories: 1) Current religious, national, 
and social categorization and differentiation in Northern Ireland, 2) Participants’ own 
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identification, including both type of identification and degree of identification, and 3) How 
participants form social identity and the factors contributing to their identity. 
Social categorization and differentiation in Northern Ireland 
Moderate vs. Radical 
Participants acknowledged that Irish Catholic and British Protestant identities are still 
prevalent in Northern Ireland today, but made distinctions in the degrees to which these identities 
are salient to people, i.e. how radical an individual is in their sense of Irish Catholicism or British 
Protestantism. They stated that while some people still hold sectarian beliefs, they see the 
majority of Northern Ireland as moderate and tolerant. 
Extremists are probably only about ten percent of the entire population of Northern 
Ireland. The rest, the other 45% are Protestant, 45% Catholics just like, are happy 
enough. My dad they grew up in some crazy times, you know, having troubles during the 
’80s and ’70s. And nowadays people have wised-up. They know that it's stupid, there's no 
point in it. It just causes more trouble, you know? (Male, Northern Irish and British, 
Atheist and Protestant) 
 
Likewise, almost every participant felt that their generation was more tolerant than their 
parents’ generation, and many noted less discrimination along religious or national lines. 
The older generation is very stuck in their ways. They would never change, especially 
with religion and people’s sexuality or people’s color because they were so used to that in 
the other days. But, with younger people, you know, they realize you don’t need to be 
completely obsessed with your religion, and give other people a chance. My best friend is 
Catholic and it doesn’t affect me. Whenever I go down to her house I don’t feel scared or 
anything. (Female, Northern Irish and British, Not religious and Protestant) 
 
I think back during The Troubles it was an issue. My father said the family wasn’t 
particularly happy that my dad was marrying my mom. But he carried on regardless. He 
didn’t mind. Nowadays, I don’t think its really quite so much an issue, not with the 
people that I know anyway. My brother is going out with a Protestant and no one really 
cares. (Male, Irish, Atheist) 
 
Fifteen participants feel their generation is more tolerant than their parents’, and one feels 
that it is about the same amount of tolerance. Furthermore, participants prefer these mixed, 
moderate, or tolerant groups and often explicitly identify as non-sectarian, placing themselves in 
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a different category from those that are more radical. 
I think most people would prefer to not live in a very sectarian area. I don't know, some 
areas in west and east Belfast I wouldn't really like to live in, but I'd look at the place 
before living actually living there, and if it was a very “flag-y” area. If it was just 
sporadic, I wouldn't mind. But if the flags were everywhere, if they were really all over 
the place, I don’t know, that’s a lot of…culture…there. (Male, Irish, Atheist and 
Catholic) 
 
More tolerant. Much more tolerant. You find strong opinions in extremists, but yeah, the 
vast majority of people in my generation are non-sectarian. And I try my best to never, 
ever be sectarian. The minority make the rest of us look bad. (Male, Irish and Ulster, Not 
religious) 
 
From this, it is evident that a new social category exists in Northern Ireland among young 
adults: the tolerant vs. the intolerant, or the moderate vs. the radical, with participants displaying 
in-group favoritism for the tolerant.  
Religious, nationality, politics not as synonymous 
Participants also feel that religion, nationality, and political ideology are not as 
synonymous anymore, confirming evidence in the literature. 
A lot of people within the republican community, they go to like commemorations and 
stuff for members of Sinn Féin or the IRA that died in the conflict and such, and Queen’s 
Sinn Féin president got it passed within the entire election ring, the biggest party in 
Northern Ireland, he got it passed there last year that you’re not allowed to have any 
religious affiliation at any of the commemorations, which I thought was cool. He said, 
you don’t have to be a Catholic to remember the dead. I think that’s a good example of a 
radical who wants to make a change. There’s always that association that if you’re 
nationalist you’re a Catholic as well. But, the president of Sinn Féin is an adamant 
atheist, which I thought was kind of cool. (Male, Northern Irish, Irish, and British, 
Agnostic) 
 
I feel more connected to being British because I was in the army. I grew up in this mixed 
community, where everyone's so friendly, but despite me being a Protestant and all there, 
it's like there's so many things you can be, Northern Irish or you can be this and you can 
be that. So when I went into the army, since it's the British army, you think “Well if I'm 
in the British army, I'm British.” That's the way it is. (Male, British, Not religious and 
Protestant) 
 
Religion and nationality are less overlapping, indicating a more fluid system of identity 
among young adults and a shift in social categorization. 
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Religious labels 
When describing sectarian groups or using labels to differentiate between people, 
participants overwhelmingly use religious terms, rather than using religion, nationality, and 
political ideology interchangeably. 
This is probably sounding quite bad, but I would say it’s the Protestants that are a lot 
worse than the Catholics. However, they can both be as bad as each other. But I just think 
sometimes the Protestants will throw everything over the top. Like the 12th in particular, 
that’s all Protestants. Whereas St. Patrick’s Day is mostly a Catholic thing, however even 
Protestants will celebrate that here. It doesn’t bother them having Protestants walking 
around. But some people, if they saw Catholics around on the 12th, they would be very 
angry. You get the occasional fight on St. Patrick’s Day, but that’s mostly just, you know, 
drunk people. (Female, Northern Irish and British, Not religious and Protestant). 
 
This opinion that Protestants cause more trouble than Catholics was common among 
participants, even if the participants identified as British or Protestant themselves.  
Of the sixteen participants interviewed, eleven almost exclusively used religious 
terminology, three used religious and political labels, and one used religious and national labels. 
Only one did not employ religious terminology, but instead used political labels; this participant 
identified as Northern Irish, Irish, and British, and agnostic.  
By primarily using religious labels, participants sort others into groups based on their 
religious identity, even if participants themselves don’t feel that religion is an important part of 
who they are. This is surprising, given the historical overlap of nationality and religion. 
Therefore, to young adults, it appears that divisive social categories hinge more upon religion 
than nationality, showing an association of social partition with religious identity over national 
identity. 
It should be noted, however, that participants hold mixed opinions of religion and 
religious institutions. Some participants feel that religion has been an issue in society or in their 
family personally, while others note a more positive experience.  
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My grandfather was very, very religious, and a lot of times it alienated the family, and I 
think my mother distanced herself from that. (Male, Northern Irish, Irish, and British, 
Agnostic) 
 
Going to mass growing up, they were very neutral. They'd occasionally have the Irish 
mass on St. Patrick's Day but apart from that, there were really good about it. (Male, 
Irish, Atheist and Catholic) 
 
Participants that attended religiously-affiliated schools have generally positive opinions 
of them, noting that teachers and administration did not try to force any views on them. 
Growing up I went to a Catholic school. I think it was pretty inclusive. We had 
Protestants going there. We had Muslims, Hindus going there as well. Obviously most 
people there would have called themselves Irish. But yeah, there were Gaelic sports, but 
you could also play rugby or basketball, whatever floats your boat. Sometimes we maybe 
had to say a prayer, you know? At the start of the school day or something like that. But 
if you didn’t want to do it, you didn’t have to do it. There were no issues there, I don’t 
think. (Male, Irish and Northern Irish, Not religious) 
 
In secondary school we had religion classes and all, but I don’t think they tried to force it 
on us. If you had an opinion, they’d listen to you. They wouldn’t be like, “that’s wrong, 
this is what you have to believe.” (Male, Irish, Not religious) 
 
When examining opinions of religion or religious institutions, however, there is no 
pattern of terminology use based on these views. 
Young adult identification 
Radical to neutral 
Several participants expressed a change in their opinions of social groups as they aged. 
I suppose when I was a kid, with all the stupidity of, you know, that age...if I were to 
write down it would be “Irish—good, Catholic—good, British—bad, Protestant—bad.” 
But yeah, as I grew older, you grow out of those things, out of that kind of tribal 
mentality cause all your friends are from the same place as you. And as you meet more 
people, your impression of the world grows a lot bigger, you become more tolerant. So 
obviously I look back like “What an idiot.” (Male, Irish and Northern Irish, Not religious) 
 
I grew up with all these stereotypes about Protestants and stuff. But once I met 
Protestants for myself I realized they weren’t always true. (Male, Irish, Atheist and 
Catholic) 
 
Eleven participants expressed similar stories of holding more radical or intolerant views 
as children, and the remaining five asserted that even from a young age they thought about both 
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sides or didn’t hold any unfavorable beliefs about any particular group. This supports the idea 
that identity is not fixed, and furthermore asserts that young people are often not born into a state 
of neutrality, despite the great strides in peace processes Northern Ireland has made. Young 
adults must negotiate their own identity against previously structured religious and national 
categorization. 
Participants cite travel outside of Northern Ireland or contact with others of a different 
identity as the catalyst for this evolution in thinking. 
I used to be very strongly republican. It sounds ridiculous, but at one point I actually 
wanted to be the president of Ireland. But the more that I travelled and got out of Belfast, 
the more it certainly has mellowed. I’m a lot more neutral than I used to be. (Female, 
Irish, Catholic) 
 
I went on a six-week trip to America, and another guy from here went, too, and he was a 
Protestant. He was a bit of an asshole, but at the same time I realized that I’m also an 
asshole. So I realized he’s just like me, so I was like, why should I hate him? (Male, Irish, 
Not religious) 
 
They aspire to present themselves to others as someone who is neutral, moderate, or 
tolerant. Their motivation is often personal safety and a desire to not create trouble if they do 
encounter someone who holds sectarian beliefs. 
I don’t mind [being Catholic] really, it’s just the way I was brought up. It’s fine to me, in 
the way that you can’t really tell anybody about it. You know what I mean? You have to 
keep it a secret here. There’s just so much conflict here. You have to pretend that you 
have no religion, no culture, no identity at all because you have to be safe. (Male, Irish, 
Not religious and Catholic) 
 
Because young adults view those who are sectarian as the out-group, they accordingly 
downplay their religious or national identity to remain in the in-group. Participants display this 
behavior even if their parents are more radical. 
Disassociation with religion 
In addition to using religious labels, participants were very quick to dissociate themselves 
with a religious identity. When asked how they identify nationally, every participant responded 
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that they were Irish, British, or Northern Irish. Regarding religion, however, almost all 
participants strongly asserted that they were not religious, atheist, or agnostic. 
I'm not religious. I mean, I was raised Catholic, but it’s kind of just a box you tick, but, 
no, I’m not Catholic. (Male, Irish and Northern Irish, Not religious) 
 
Fifteen of sixteen participants identify as not religious, atheist, or agnostic. Of these, 
seven are solely irreligious, three also identify as Catholic, and five also identify as Protestant. 
Only one participant identified as Catholic and religious. This high response of irreligiosity 
comes from participants that did not regularly attend church services growing up as well as those 
that did. While participants do not emphatically positively talk about nationality either, they do 
not dissociate from a national identity to the extent they do a religious one. Irreligious, atheist, 
agnostic, and Northern Irish are inherently neutral stances, but participants do not identify as 
Northern Irish (n = 5) at the same rate they are irreligious, atheist, or agnostic (n = 15). 
Furthermore, while Western Europe is becoming less religious in general, religious identity in 
Northern Ireland is typically thought of as an ethnic measure rather than an indication of 
theological beliefs. 
I'm really only Protestant on paper. Whenever I have to write it down. Like whenever 
you're filling out a form that says, “Are you Catholic or Protestant?” keep in mind, it 
doesn't actually matter if you're religious, just, it's your background that sort of identifies 
it. (Male, British, Atheist and Protestant) 
 
While young adults are more likely to describe others in religious terms, they are less 
likely to describe themselves in this way. This lends question, therefore, to why young adults 
associate division with religion more than nationality. 
Identity formation 
Family influence 
For some, parents are a significant factor in the creation or inheritance of identity, 
whether it be along traditional lines of identity or otherwise. 
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When I was growing up I didn’t really think about identity for myself, I just grew up in it, 
cause I did come from a very religious family. So, it wasn’t forced upon me but that was 
kind of what I became accustomed to so that’s what I adopted. (Female, Irish, Catholic) 
 
When I was 16, I actually hated both Catholics and Protestants; I wanted to be like my 
own identity. And then I got older and realized the values of families and how important 
it is. So I got into being more Catholic and more relaxed in that sort of community. Cause 
that’s your family. (Male, Irish, Not religious and Catholic) 
 
One participant believes relationships and marriage have an effect on a person’s identity 
as well. 
The only time I've ever seen anyone change is because they married someone or got into 
a relationship with someone. Then, obviously, they reassert it depending on what's the 
dominant one in the relationship. (Female, Northern Irish, Not religious) 
 
 Others assert that those living in Northern Ireland can’t just pick an identity, as it is 
dictated by one’s background. 
When you're filling out a form or whatever, you have to be one or the other, generally. I'd 
like to tick the neither box but I can't really because of my background. I've sort of 
realized recently how important national identity is and that, as I was growing up, I tried 
to sort of just avoid it. Didn't realize that no, that’s part of me whether I want it to be or 
not. Like if I could, I would just be Northern Irish and I would just forget about the whole 
thing. But you can't just do that. (Male, British, Atheist and Protestant) 
 
While parents may influence what an individual identifies as, they have less influence 
over the degree to which a person adopts that identity. 
My mum’s got really strong opinions. But she lets me have my own, you know, she's not 
going to force me into anything. I’m probably less British than she'd prefer me to be. But 
she also says that she's glad that I'm not because of all the troubles that I could get into 
and then bring to her door. (Male, Northern Irish and British, Atheist and Protestant) 
 
Participants raised in a strongly Irish Catholic or British Protestant household usually 
held that identity to some extent, however, even if it was minimal. 
Area influence 
Several felt their geographic upbringing, especially the identity of the town or 
neighborhood they were raised in, informed their group membership. 
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Most of the time I do feel just like Irish and it doesn't really change that much because 
I've already grown up in a more Irish nationalist society. It’s just basically based on my 
geography because all the people around me felt Irish as well. (Male, Irish, Atheist and 
Catholic) 
 
I'm a Protestant because of the location of the schools that I've gone to where I grew up 
and stuff. (Male, British, Atheist and Protestant) 
 
As a territory of the United Kingdom but geographic neighbor of the Republic of Ireland, 
many feel there is a distinction between those identifying as Irish and British in Northern Ireland 
and those identifying as such elsewhere. 
There’s a growing third subgroup, the Northern Irish. And it’s not even because of how 
we feel, it’s because of how we’re viewed from people from Britain and the South. The 
Southerners don’t see us as fully Irish, and equally the British don’t see us as fully 
British. So you think, well what are you fighting for if you’re not even acknowledged? So 
we’ve got that third group coming up, and I think that’s a very positive thing actually. 
(Female, Irish, Catholic) 
 
My girlfriend would call herself Northern Irish and British, but she would say Northern 
Irish first, British second, Ulster third, and Irish never. Whereas I would say Irish, Ulster, 
maybe Northern Irish like 5%, because there is a difference between me and someone 
from Cork. It’s a regional difference just like there’s a difference between me and 
someone from Manchester. (Male, Irish and Ulster, Not religious) 
 
Two participants, both Irish, furthermore feel that they are treated as tourists when 
visiting southern Ireland, despite considering themselves Irish as well. 
Identification based on schools appeared to be more about the types of students attending 
the school or the location of the school, rather than the administration or affiliation of the school 
itself. As demonstrated previously, schools in Northern Ireland typically do not try to 
indoctrinate their students into a set of beliefs or identities.  
Overall, I found that young adults form a less dichotomous, juxtaposed sector of society 
in terms of nationality and religion, but transfer this “us vs. them” mentality to those that are 
more moderate and those that are more radical. They dissociate with a religious identity more 
than a national one, despite the historical overlap of religion and nationality in Northern Ireland. 
Moreover, they typically do not match the fervor of their parents’ identity, unless their parents 
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are very moderate themselves, but show an attachment to this identity nonetheless. Geographic 
upbringing has a significant effect on young adults’ religious and national identity, and while 
some feel they get to choose their identity, others feel it is dictated by their social and physical 
environment. 
Discussion 
 The findings of this study show both positive outcomes and potential shortcomings in the 
changing processes of identity in Northern Ireland. Today, parents in Northern Ireland are no 
longer afraid to send their children to school, Irish Catholics and British Protestants are 
commonly close friends, and the two communities exist relatively peacefully. Successful efforts 
to improve relations are evident in participants’ level of moderation as well as their preference 
for mixed or tolerant groups. Young adults’ desires for peace and neutrality far outweigh any 
nationalist or unionist desires, indicating that a referendum or revival in sectarian conflict over 
the territorial state of Northern Ireland is unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
 However, a lack of non-sectarian religious vocabulary in Northern Ireland may cause 
young adults to feel they cannot hold a strong religious identity. Young adults are not able to call 
themselves Catholic or Protestant without others applying a sectarian connotation. While this is 
not necessarily a problem for an individual who is theologically irreligious, this does pose an 
issue for those who are theologically religious: they must weigh their religious beliefs against the 
desire to present themselves as neutral. 
 There are several potential explanations for young adults’ use of religious labels when 
describing social groups. Affiliation of most schools as Catholic or Protestant may create a sense 
of grouping based on religion early in a child’s formation; thus, even if a school itself is very 
moderate, children develop a sense of distinction between Catholic and Protestant, attributing 
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those labels to social groups overall. It is additionally possible that nationality inherently means 
more to young adults in Northern Ireland, making it easier to attribute a religious identity to 
sectarian groups. Further research is required in this area.  
Conclusions 
It is important to note that this study does not attempt to explain young adults’ social 
identity as a whole, but the religious and national facets to their social identity. The change in 
social grouping from “Irish vs. British” to “radical vs. moderate” indicates that there is not a lack 
of social distinction, but rather, a shift in social categorization to level of tolerance. While some 
research argues that parents are the most influential factor in the religiosity of young adults, the 
conflict surrounding religion in Northern Ireland and the emphasis placed on tolerance appears to 
trump radicalness of parents (Briggs 2014).  
 However, this sample is overrepresented with university-educated students. Highly 
educated individuals are more likely to be tolerant, indicating a potential skew of these results 
toward a more moderate front. While the less educated participants in this study did not display 
different attitudes than the more educated participants, this would be better examined with a 
larger sample. Time of year may also be a factor in participants’ responses, as tensions in 
Northern Ireland are heightened around the 12th of July. The imbalance of men and women is 
likely due to recruiting through Reddit.  
 There are implications for this study both within Northern Ireland and outside of it. These 
results show the complexity of identity for young adults, as well as the distinction between 
religion and nationality, relevant for both political and religious organizations. Additionally, this 
highlights problems in the lack of distinction between theological religious identity and ethnic 
religious identity in Northern Ireland surveys. Furthermore, because it is relatively safe to 
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conduct interviews on religion and nationality in Northern Ireland, this research may have 
applications for countries with ethnic conflict where individuals do not feel as free to voice their 
opinions. 
Notes 
1 While in many areas of the world, the term “youth” encompasses the young adult population, 
studies on youth in Northern Ireland typically restrict age to younger than eighteen years, 
synonymous with the American definition. 
2 ‘Neutral’ signifies an area of mixed Irish and British representation, comparably low conflict, 
low sectarianism, and/or higher tolerance. 
3 Northern Ireland: 39.89% British, 25.26% Irish, 20.94% Northern Irish; Belfast: 35.07% 
British, 31.08% Irish, 18.73% Northern Irish; Londonderry/Derry: 19.81% British, 51.86% Irish, 
19.75% Northern Irish. 
4 Indicates that the participant solely named that identity or named it first, indicating that this was 
how they primarily or mostly identify. 
5 Northern Irish, then British: n = 2; Irish, then Ulster: n = 1; Irish, then Northern Irish: n = 1; 
Northern Irish, then Irish, then British: n = 1. 
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